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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the FCC’s victory at the Supreme Court, media ownership will
continue to be an important democratic issue complicated by the continuing
mandate for action by the agency.1 Even in the Internet age, broadcasting
still plays a central role in providing access to local news and information
providing a crucial mechanism for encouraging political participation.2
Between 1996 and 2017 the FCC implemented a media ownership
policy with the intent of balancing the economic goals associated with the
free market goals of competition, the democratic societal values associated
with viewpoint diversity, and the operational concerns of localism. 3 This
regulatory matrix of competition, localism, and diversity has been the pillar
of media ownership policy since the agency’s rulemaking proceeding that
implemented the newspaper-broadcast cross ownership ban in 1975.4
Beginning with the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act,5 the FCC formally abandoned the trustee model that had guided the
agency’s regulation of broadcasters since 1927.6 In place of the traditional
regulatory model in place since broadcasters were first licensed, the FCC
adopted a new regulatory philosophy which relied on the use of an economic
approach.7 This new “competition” focused philosophy had a dramatic effect
on the agency’s media ownership rules.8 Perhaps more importantly, the rules
implementing this new philosophy resulted in a 39% reduction in radio
station owners and a 33% reduction in television station owners between
1996-2010.9
Furthermore, attempting to balance the stated policy goals of
competition, localism and diversity against decisions that rapidly approved
mergers,10 proved difficult. And the FCC’s failure to develop and use

1. Christopher Terry, Localism as a Solution to Market Failure: Helping the FCC Comply with the
Telecommunications Act, 71 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 327, 328–29 (2019) (discussing the possibility of
localism as a remedy for market failure).
2. Id. at 330.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 334. See generally In re Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the
Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast
Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975).
5. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 303.
6. Radio Act of 1927, 47 U.S.C. §§ 81–85, 119–21 (repealed 1934).
7. Ronald E. Rice, Central Concepts in Media Ownership Research and Regulation, in MEDIA
OWNERSHIP: RESEARCH AND REGULATION (2008).
8. See Terry, supra note 1 at 334 (“[The FCC] increasingly came to use the level of economic
competition in a media market to assess the level of viewpoint diversity . . . in the market.”).
9. Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 75 Fed. Reg. 33227, 33227 (2010) (quadrennial rev.) (to be codified
at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) (“Today, there are 11,202 commercial radio stations and 3,143 owners, representing
a 39% decrease in the number of [commercial radio station] owners since 1996. . . . [Today], there are
1,302 commercial stations and 303 owners, a 33% decrease in the number of owners.”).
10. Christopher Terry, Stephen Schmitz & Eliezer (Lee) Joseph Silberberg, The Score is 4-0: FCC
Media Ownership Policy, Prometheus Radio Project, and Judicial Review, 73 FED. COMMC’NS L. J. 99,
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empirical evidence in its rulemaking undermined the policy process across
biennial reviews in 1998, 2000 and 2002, quadrennial reviews in 2006, 2010,
and 2014.11 This policy shortcoming culminated in the FCC’s perpendicular
actions in 2016 and 2017.12
Following the FCC’s decision in 2003 to radically alter the metrics on
media ownership policy with the Diversity Index, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals started a lengthy back and forth with the agency that spanned four
court decisions, remand and more than 17 years of policy-litigation cycles
where the FCC’s policy implementation became a regulatory quagmire.13
Although the FCC has overcome a series of order vacations and remands
from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals due to the unanimous, but narrow,
decision from the Supreme Court, the agency remains in a precarious
position. As it stands, the FCC has a mandate to complete an open, but
unacted upon quadrennial review from 2018 as well as another quadrennial
process slated to begin in 2022.14
This paper explores the decision in FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project
in the context of more than 25 years of media ownership policy decisions by
the agency suggesting that although the FCC finally managed to score a win
in court, the narrow decision left many issues unresolved as the FCC now
finds itself in a time pinch to meet the standing mandate for quadrennial
reviews scheduled for 2018 and 2022.

II. SECTION 202(H), THE ROOT OF IT ALL
Before delving fully into the complicated narrative of the Prometheus
case line, it is imperative to know how the matter came to the Court. That
explanation begins with Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.15 Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act specifies that:

107 (2020) (“The FCC openly encouraged further ownership consolidation to occur at a rate faster than
the agency could empirically assess . . . .”) [hereinafter Prometheus 4-0].
11. See generally id. (discussing the Third Circuit’s repeated admonition of the FCC for failing to
develop an empirically sound methodology of evaluating market consolidation).
12. See Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section
202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 32 FCC Rcd. 9803, 9803, 9806–46 (2017) (quadrennial
rev.) (explaining the FCC’s reasoning for reversing course for each of the rules at issue). This is an
important and underexamined fact about the FCC’s decisions in 2016 and 2017. After the mandate the
finish the 2010 and 2014 proceedings in Prometheus III, the FCC’s decision after six years and two rule
reviews was to change no rules. Fifteen months later, based on the same record, a FCC under new
leadership decided that radical changes to media ownership were warranted based on petitions for
reconsideration. See, e.g., id. at 9818 (“The NBCO Rule must be Eliminated.”).
13. See generally Prometheus 4-0, supra note 13, for a detailed history tracking media ownership
from the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act through the Third Circuit’s final
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC decision in 2017.
14. See 47 U.S.C. § 161(a) (requiring the FCC to engage in “review” of “all regulations issued under
this chapter” “in every even-numbered year”).
15. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 110 (1996).
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The Commission shall review its rules adopted pursuant to this section and all
of its ownership rules biennially as part of its regulatory reform review under
section 11 of the Communications Act of 1934 and shall determine whether
any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of
competition. The Commission shall repeal or modify any regulation it
determines to be no longer in the public interest.16

Section 202(h) requires the FCC to engage in post-promulgation review
of its regulations every two years—but the presumptions that attend the
command to revisit older rules are opaque.17
So much more is left unclear, however. For example, it is unclear how
Section 202(h)’s text requires the FCC to act at all. 18 There is, of course, no
explanation for how the FCC should go about making that determination
within the text of the provision. Nor is it obvious how the FCC is to
determine the extent of its obligation to “determine” what is “in the public
interest” so that regulations remain somewhat stable for more than just two
years.
Furthermore, the primary focus of the section is difficult to determine
from the plain text of the provision. The plain text of the provision indicates
that rules “necessary in the public interest as the result of competition” are
what the FCC is determining. But it is far from clear whether “competition”
or “public interest” controls the sentence. To make matters worse, this
command is ostensibly the primary purpose of the section, and parties have
strenuously disagreed on which phrase controls the sentence.19
The FCC launched the first of the mandated biennial reviews for media
ownership rules under Section 202(h) on March 12, 1998.20 The 17 month

16. § 202(h), 110 Stat. at 111. Still, courts vehemently disagreed about the presumptive nature of
this regulatory re-review. For example, the Third Circuit disagreed with the D.C. Circuit concerning
whether or not there was a “presumption in favor of repealing or modifying the ownership rules.”
Compare Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620, 13624–25, 13624 n.13 (2003) (biennial
rev.) (“Several parties . . . support the notion that Section 202(h) presumptively favors repeal or
modification of the ownership rules.”), with Prometheus Radio Project v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 373
F.3d 372, 423 (3d Cir. 2004) (“As discussed in Part II above, § 202(h) is not a one-way ratchet. The
Commission is free to regulate or deregulate as long as its regulations are in the public interest and are
supported by a reasoned analysis.”) [hereinafter Prometheus I].
17. It is unclear whether this form of regulatory budgeting is inherently deregulatory in nature as
was argued before the Court. See supra note 19 (discussing the disagreement between circuit courts on
the presumptive guidance of Section 202(h)).
18. Compare Opening Brief for Industry Petitioners at 20, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Prometheus
Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150 (2021) (No. 19-1231) (“The plain text of the statute establishes a
deregulatory presumption requiring the FCC to ‘repeal or modify’ any rule that is no longer ‘necessary
in the public interest as the result of competition.’”), with Brief for Respondents Prometheus at 8, Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150 (2021) (No. 19-1231) (“For § 202(h),
like the cross-referenced § 11, any ‘deregulatory presumption arises only after [the Commission] has
determined . . . that a regulation is no longer necessary in the public interest.’”).
19. See infra note 163 and corresponding text.
20. The FCC already began the process of reviewing two ownership rules. The first, the television
duopoly rule prevented a party from owning, operating, or controlling two or more broadcast television
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long review examined seven ownership policies using the guidelines set by
Section 202(h).21 During review of its media ownership rules, but before
approving changes to those rules, the FCC granted a series of conditional
waivers to various owners, anticipating future review changes.22 By
continuing to grant waivers, even conditionally, the FCC was encouraging
further ownership consolidation to occur at a rate faster than the agency
could empirically assess the results of its freshly approved mergers.23 Indeed,
when the 1998 Biennial Review concluded, the FCC admitted that it could
not meaningfully assess the fallout of the sweeping ownership consolidation
since 1996.24
The difficulty the FCC faced in keeping up with the requirements of
202(h) was the first sign of cracks within the legislative scheme. 202(h)
contemplated quick turn-around—every two years the FCC would keep pace
with the industry it regulated. But that simply was infeasible. In fact, by the
end of the very first review, the FCC had not yet completed approving the
initial wave of mergers or assessing the outcomes of entities granted
waivers.25
After concluding the 1998 Biennial Review, the FCC proposed using
the 2000 Biennial Review to build a framework to “form the basis for further
action.”26 The FCC couched the proposal as an opportunity to build a
working framework for future reviews under Section 202(h), ahead of the

stations with overlapping “Grade B” signal contours, essentially preventing the ownership of more than
one television station in a market. Additionally, the FCC launched a review of the “one-to-a-market” rule,
which prohibited the common ownership of a television and a radio station in the same market.
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 13 FCC Rcd. 11276, 11276, 11279–80 (1998) (biennial rev.).
21. See id. at 11279–92 (discussing the seven policies for 202(h) review).
22. For example, QueenB’s request for waiver in DA 97-1067 at 14: “Because the present case also
proposes a commonly owned television station, we must next determine whether to waive our one-to-amarket rule. In considering the current request for a permanent waiver we will follow the policy
established in recent one-to-a-market waiver cases where the radio component to a proposed combination
exceeds those permitted prior to the adoption of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. . . . In such cases,
the [FCC] declined to grant permanent waivers of the one-to-a-market rule, and instead granted temporary
waivers conditioned on the outcome of related issues raised in the television ownership rulemaking
proceeding. . . . Similarly, we conclude that a permanent, unconditional waiver would not be appropriate
here. QueenB has, however, demonstrated sufficient grounds for us to grant a temporary waiver
conditioned on the outcome of the rulemaking proceeding.” Concrete River Associates, L.P., 12 FCC
Rcd. 6614, 6618 (1997) (assigning a license to QueenB Radio and establishing that QueenB was granted
temporary waiver as a “failed” station).
23. See Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section
202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 FCC Rcd. 11058, 11061 (2000) (biennial rev.) (“As
noted above, we have just recently substantially relaxed our local television ownership and one-to-amarket rules.”).
24. See id. (“It is currently too soon to tell what effect his will have consolidation, competition, and
diversity.”).
25. See id.
26. 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review, 16 FCC Rcd. 1207, 1210 (2001) (biennial rev.). While the
review was of existing regulations agency wide, media ownership rules were reviewed by the Media
Bureau staff during the 2000 proceeding. See id.

Winter 2021

WE DIDN’T STOP THE FIRE

99

biennial review process scheduled to begin in 2002. As part of the process,
the FCC proposed retaining, but modifying, three of its media ownership
rules while eliminating a fourth.
In the 2002 Biennial Review NPRM, the FCC proposed four possible
proxy methodologies for assessing diversity: viewpoint diversity, source
diversity, program diversity, and outlet diversity. 27 Viewpoint diversity is a
content-based measurement and policy.28 While both source diversity and
program diversity examine content indirectly, viewpoint diversity requires a
direct analysis of the content itself.29 More importantly the agency
reenforced its long standing positions that viewpoint diversity was the
ultimate policy objective of media ownership policy.30
In context, the FCC’s stated objective in the 2002 Biennial Review was
to redefine the diversity goals of media ownership policy. By using the
competition objective, the FCC implemented modifications to structural
ownership regulation as a proxy for the goals of localism and diversity. 31
Employing a raw counting methodology for media outlets, including
newspapers, broadcasters, cable, and the Internet,32 the agency shifted media
ownership policy away from the viewpoint diversity objective by creating an
ownership environment that would “advance diversity without regulatory
requirements.”33
On July 2, 2003, the FCC released an Order in the 2002 Biennial
Review proceeding.34 The FCC’s 2002 Biennial Review Order retained the
(then) existing limits on local radio ownership as defined by the
Telecommunication Act, but it made two significant changes to its method
for calculating the size of a radio market, adopting market definitions for

27. Commission Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant
to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 17 FCC Rcd. 18503, 18516 (2002) (biennial
rev.).
28. See id. at 18516–17.
29. See id. at 18517–18.
30. Viewpoint diversity “has been the touchstone of the [FCC]’s ownership rules and policies. We
remain fully committed to preserving citizens’ access to a diversity of viewpoints through the media.” Id.
at 18516–17. Despite its pole-position as a policy outcome, the FCC was reluctant to employ viewpoint
diversity as a direct measurement or assessment methodology. The FCC was concerned that regulations
involving judgments about content would be inherently subjective and would prove problematic under
the First Amendment. Id. at 18512.
31. Though this view would not be stated in such language until 2003, this viewpoint is readily
visible within the 2002 review process. See Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620, 13620–
23, 13668–91 (2003) (biennial rev.) (“The changes described herein provide a new, comprehensive
framework for broadcast ownership regulation.”).
32. Id. at 13391–99.
33. Supra note 30, at 18519. It should be noted that the FCC did acknowledge that there may be a
need for regulation to protect viewpoint diversity in the 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, but its
subsequent actions did not appear to suggest that it followed up on this musing.
34. Supra note 34, at 13620.
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radio as defined by Arbitron,35 and including local non-commercial stations
when calculating the total number of stations in each market.36 Furthermore,,
the Order replaced two other existing media ownership rules with the FCC’s
own creation: the Diversity Index.37
None of the new limits, rule modifications, existence of the Diversity
Index, or any rationale for any of the changes were made public ahead of the
release of the Order implementing these changes on June 3, 2003.38

III. THE FIRE BEGINS
Two groups—”citizen petitioners”39 and “deregulatory petitioners”40 —
challenged the FCC’s 2003 Order on media ownership in multiple federal
circuit courts, and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated
the petitions.41 After a preliminary hearing, the Third Circuit stayed
implementation of the FCC’s rules pending review, and denied a petition

35. Id. at 13725; see id. at 13725–28 for a deeper explanation of how the FCC came to their decision.
36. Id. at 13727. The 2003 Order also retained the dual network rule, which prohibited a merger
between any two of the top four broadcast television networks, but the agency revised the national
television ownership rule to permit a single party to own television stations reaching 45% (rather than
35%) of the national audience. Id. at 13847–48 (dual network rule), 13842-43 (national television
ownership rule).
37. Id. at 13778. That diversity index is a modified version of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) – an antitrust tool traditionally applied by the Department of Justice and the FTC for analyzing
impact of mergers on market consolidation. Id. at 13777.
38. This was just the first time that the FCC failed to notice such changes. See Prometheus Radio
Project v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 652 F.3d 431, 451 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the FCC 2006
Quadrennial Review provided too little information to the public about what the FCC intended to do, that
it did not sufficiently explain what the FCC considered as options, and that it did not provide sufficient
time for public comment) [hereinafter Prometheus II]; Christopher Terry & Caitlin Ring Carlson,
Hatching Some Empirical Evidence: Minority Ownership Policy and the FCC’s Incubator Program, 24
COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 403, 416 (2019).
39. In the Prometheus I opinion, the court assigned the various petitioners to two groups. The first
was referred to as the “Citizen Petitioners.” “Prometheus Radio Project, Media Alliance, National Council
of the Churches of Christ in the United States, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, Center for Digital
Democracy, Consumer Union and Consumer Federation of America, Minority Media and
Telecommunications Council (representing numerous trade, consumer, professional, and civic
organizations concerned with telecommunications policy as it relates to racial minorities and women),
and Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ (“UCC”) (intervenor). The Network
Affiliated Stations Alliance, representing the CBS Television Network Affiliates Association, the NBC
Television Affiliates, and the ABC Television Affiliates, and Capitol Broadcasting Company, Inc.
(intervenor) also raised anti-deregulatory challenges to the national television ownership rule.”
Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 381 n.1.
40. See id. at 381 n.2, stating that the “Deregulatory Petitioners,” included: “Clear Channel
Communications, Inc.; Emmis Communications Corporation; Fox Entertainment Group, Inc.; Fox
Television Stations, Inc.; Media General Inc.; National Association of Broadcasters; National
Broadcasting Company, Inc.; Paxson Communications Corporation; Sinclair Broadcast Group;
Telemundo Communications Group, Inc.; Tribune Company; Viacom Inc.; Belo Corporation
(intervenor); Gannett Corporation (intervenor); Morris Communications Company (intervenor);
Millcreek Broadcasting LLC (intervenor); Nassau Broadcasting Holdings (intervenor); Nassau
Broadcasting II, LLC (intervenor); Newspaper Association of America (intervenor); and Univision
Communications, Inc. (intervenor).”
41. Id. at 382.
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filed jointly by members of the deregulatory petitioners and the FCC to
return the case to the D.C. Circuit.42
Following argument, the Third Circuit, released a 2-1 decision, which
stayed and remanded most of the FCC’s 2003 Order.43 Among the primary
reasons for remand was the FCC’s arbitrary and capricious decision-making
process and the lack of supporting evidence for its decisions in the record.
The majority interpreted Section 202(h) as a requirement to periodically
justify existing regulations, which absent the review provision, the FCC
would not have an obligation to complete.44 Additionally, when the FCC
engages in the review of its rules, it must determine if rules remain useful to
the public interest. Rules deemed no longer useful must be repealed or
modified.45 But after reviewing a rule, regardless of what the FCC
determined to be the proper action, whether “retain, repeal, or modify
(whether to make more or less stringent)—it must do so in the public interest
and support its decision with a reasoned analysis.”46
Judge Ambro then invalidated the FCC’s new cross-ownership limits
and Diversity Index methodology for failing hard look review. 47 While the
ruling noted that the FCC’s decision to replace cross-ownership rules with
the new limits was constitutional and allowable in context of Section
202(h)’s mandate, its procedure was its ultimate flaw, as the FCC failed to
demonstrate a reasoned analysis.48 In effect, the majority did not hold that
the FCC had impermissibly modified regulations under Section 202(h)’s
mandate, but had simply not provided a reasonable rationale for its
modifications.
Judge Scirica concurred in part and dissented in part in Prometheus I.49
Judge Scirica disagreed with the majority’s ruling on the basis of the
traditional administrative law premise that the court should provide agencies
deference in areas which they are expert.50 Scirica argued that the FCC was
due greater deference on implementation of the Diversity Index and

42. Id. at 389.
43. Id. at 435; see also Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted
Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620, 13747 (2003)
(biennial rev.) for a description of the cross-ownership rule explanation by the FCC.
44. Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 395 (“[Section] 202(h) extends this requirement to the [FCC]’s
decision to retain its existing regulations. This interpretation avoids a crabbed reading of the statute under
which we would have to infer, without express language, that Congress intended to curtail the [FCC]’s
rulemaking authority and to contravene ‘traditional administrative law principles.’”).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 395.
47. Id. at 435. See generally Motor Vehicle Mfr’s Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983)
(establishing the “Hard Look Doctrine”).
48. Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 418.
49. Id. at 435.
50. Id. (“Whether the standard is ‘arbitrary or capricious,’ ‘reasonableness,’ or some variant of a
‘deregulatory presumption,’ the Court has applied a threshold that supplants the well-known principles
of deference accorded to agency decision-making.”).
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proposed changes to the rules.51 Instead, Scirica accused the Third Circuit of
supplanting the agency’s policy decision with the court’s own.52
A. THE FCC’S PLAN B
Following its first loss at the Third Circuit, in 2006, the FCC began its
first quadrennial review under the amended Section 202(h) of the
Telecommunications Act.53 Unfortunately, the agency did not publicly
release all the information weighing on its decision making, and this led to
public embarrassment that derailed the modification process. A Senate
hearing unearthed an unreleased FCC report from 2003 that empirically
demonstrated local ownership of television stations added significant content
to local television news broadcasts.54 Shortly after this study released, news
reports also surfaced that then-FCC Chairman Michael Powell ordered all
copies of the draft study destroyed—Chairman Powell denied (and continues
to deny) those allegations.55
Five days later, a second unreleased FCC study became public.56 The
study, titled “Review of the Radio Industry,” criticized the FCC’s
implementation of media ownership policy, perhaps even more fiercely than
the television localism study.57 After examining the effects of consolidation
on the radio industry between 1996 and March 2003, the report reached five
major conclusions, all of which would have caused problems for the FCC if
its 2002 Biennial Review docket included the empirical data.58
When the FCC concluded its 2006 Quadrennial Review in late 2007,
the actions proposed were modest. The FCC proposed revising only a partial
repeal of the 1975 prohibition on newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership, but
only in the top 20 media markets.59 However, the FCC took greater action

51. Id. at 435 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
52. Id. (“In so doing, the Court has substituted its own policy judgment for that of the Federal
Communications Commission and upset the ongoing review of broadcast media regulation mandated by
Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.”).
53. Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 21 FCC Rcd. 8834, 8834–35, 8836 n.10, 8838 (2006)
(quadrennial rev.).
54. Do Local Owners Deliver More Localism? Some Evidence from Local Broadcast News, FCC
1–2 (2004), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-267448A1.pdf.
55. David Folkenflik, FCC Study of TV Ownership Comes to Light, NPR (Sept. 15, 2006),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6082952.
56. See
id.;
see
also
Review
of
the
Radio
Industry,
FCC,
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-267479A1.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2020) [hereinafter The
Media Bureau Staff Research Paper Series].
57. The Media Bureau Staff Research Paper Series, supra note 59, at 2–4 (“All figures displayed in
the associated charts represent ‘smooth’ lines rather than the actual data.”).
58. See id.
59. Chairman Kevin J. Martin Proposes Revision to the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership
Rule, FCC 2 (2007), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-278113A1.pdf; see also
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 23 FCC Rcd. 2010, 2018 (2007) (Quadrennial Rev.).
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outside of the 2006 Quadrennial Review. In a parallel rulemaking
proceeding, the FCC released a new minority ownership policy 60 that
established a novel class of license applicants called “eligible entities” which
the FCC suggested could promote women and minorities.61
Both the Quadrennial Review and the eligible entity program were
challenged under the existing remand from Prometheus I.62 This brought the
same parties back before the Third Circuit—and Prometheus II came out
along the same 2-1 split.63
Despite the FCC’s relatively modest approach taken on media
ownership in 2006 Quadrennial Review, the Third Circuit found that the
FCC’s rationale, ultimate policy decision, and lack of evidence to support its
decisions, demonstrated that the FCC failed to create an adequate method of
addressing diversity of ownership.64
Again, Judge Scirica concurred in part and dissented in part—much for
the same reasons as he did in Prometheus I. Once more Judge Scirica
indicated that he dissented from the Prometheus court’s conclusion that the
FCC had fallen short of the requirements imposed by the Administrative
Procedure Act.65 Even more pointedly, Scirica indicated that the FCC could
not have failed the APA’s notice requirements because the FCC had
explicitly indicated why it was seeking comment. 66 In his mind, there was no
basis to vacate the FCC’s order on the basis of the FCC’s failure to satisfy
administrative law requirements.67
The Third Circuit then issued another remand, this time of the FCC’s
2007 decisions on media ownership, citing the agency’s continuing series of
procedural and evidentiary problems.68 Suggesting that the agency had “in

60. Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services, 23 FCC Rcd. 5922,
5924–25 (2008).
61. Id. at 5925–26. The eligible entity proposal was not a direct minority ownership policy, but a
broader and comprehensive policy for diversity, which the agency suggested could eventually include
women and minorities as eligible entities, see id.
62. Prometheus II, 652 F.3d 431, 437 (3d Cir. 2011).
63. Id. at 472 (vacating and remanding the NBCO rule but leaving intact the other rules from the
FCC’s 2008 Order).
64. Id. at 469 (citing Commissioner Copps’ part concurrence part dissent, commenting that, “We
should have started by getting an accurate count of minority and female ownership—the one that the
Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability Office both just found that we didn’t
have. . . . [W]e don’t even know how many minority and female owners there are . . . .”); In re Promoting
Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services, 23 FCC Rcd. 5922, 5983 (2008).
65. Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 472–73 (Scirica, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 474.
67. Id. at 474–75.
68. “[T]he [FCC] failed to meet the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act. We also remand those provisions of the Diversity Order that rely on the revenue-based
‘eligible entity’ definition, and the FCC’s decision to defer consideration of other proposed definitions
(such as for a socially and economically disadvantaged business, so that it may adequately justify or
modify its approach to advancing broadcast ownership by minorities and women,” id. at 437–38.
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large part punted” on the minority ownership issue,69 the Prometheus II
remand mandated that the FCC address minority ownership before the
completing of the then unfinished 2010 Quadrennial Review.
Following its second loss in court, and facing another remand that now
applied to a majority of its media ownership policies, the FCC nominally
continued the ongoing 2010 Quadrennial Review required under Section
202(h).70 As time passed, the FCC demonstrated minimal public
commitment to conducting the review process or proposing new minority
ownership policies.71 Ultimately, the agency ran out the four-year clock on
the 2010 Quadrennial Review without releasing another decision.72 As time
to complete the proceeding expired, the agency continued the 2010
Quadrennial Review as well as a formal response to the remands issued by
the Third Circuit in 2004 and 2011 by extending the ongoing process into
the launch of the 2014 Quadrennial Review.
The launch of the 2014 Quadrennial Review proceeding continued to
demonstrate the FCC’s lack of interest in resolving the remands handed
down in 2004 and 2011. 73 In the year that followed, the agency failed to
release a new proposal and released no new empirical research evaluating
the outcomes of media ownership policy. Following the extended period of
inaction by the agency, the deregulatory petitioners, the citizen petitioners,
and the FCC returned to the Third Circuit in April 2016.74
The Third Circuit panel in Prometheus III mandated agency action to
conclude the open 2010 and 2014 proceedings and deliver a new proposal
for a functional minority ownership policy before the end of the calendar
year.75 The court argued that the FCC’s delay “keeps five broadcast
ownership rules in limbo.”76 This delay resulted in “significant expense to
parties that would be able, under some of the less restrictive options being

69. “Despite our prior remand requiring the [FCC] to consider the effect of its rules on minority and
female ownership, and anticipating a workable SDB definition well before this rulemaking was
completed, the [FCC] has in large part punted yet again on this important issue. While the measures
adopted that take a strong stance against discrimination are no doubt positive, the [FCC] has not shown
that they will enhance significantly minority and female ownership, which was a stated goal of this
rulemaking proceeding. This is troubling, as the [FCC] relied on the Diversity Order to justify sidestepping, for the most part, that goal in its 2008 Order,” id. at 471–72.
70. Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant of Section 202
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 FCC Rcd. 4371, 4372 (2014) (Quadrennial Rev.).
71. Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 465.
72. See 2014 Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules, supra note 73, at 4371, 4402 & nn. 185–
86. In which the FCC explains its reasoned disagreement with the Third Circuit’s holdings that the
agency’s rulemaking procedures and outcomes on media ownership were insufficient. For further
explanation on the FCC’s about-face due to no commenter objection, see id. at 4407.
73. Id. at 4372–73.
74. Prometheus Radio Project v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 824 F.3d 33, 37 (3d Cir. 2016)
[hereinafter Prometheus III].
75. See id. at 52.
76. Id. at 51.
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considered by the [FCC], to engage in profitable combinations.”77 The court
also observed that the FCC’s delay “hamper[ed] judicial review because
there is no final agency action to challenge.”78
Once more Judge Scirica concurred and dissented. While Scirica
indicated that he agreed with the Third Circuit opinion’s disposition of two
of the rules at issue, he did not agree with the majority on its treatment of the
FCC’s inaction related to broadcast ownership rules.79 However, that dissent
was constrained.80 While Scirica indicated he would not have vacated the
broadcast ownership rules, he indicated he would compel the FCC to take
final action on the matter.81 In fact, Scirica indicated he would go so far as
to preclude venue change to ensure that the final action was taken by the
FCC.82
In sum, the Third Circuit held once more that that the FCC’s ongoing
failure to develop—and support with empirical evidence—a policy plan to
increase ownership of stations by women and minorities doomed the
agency’s action (or in this case, lack thereof).83
In response, in August 2016, the FCC released an Order that concluded
the open 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Reviews while serving as a response to
the Prometheus I and Prometheus II remands.84 After six years of agency
inaction, the FCC decided to maintain all of the existing media ownership
rules “with some minor modifications.”85
Significantly, the FCC lacked any direct evidence to support retaining
the existing rules.86 Instead, the FCC relied only on competition as a proxy
indicator to justify the rules, saying that the other two key elements of media
ownership policy—localism and viewpoint diversity—no longer were the
focal point in assessing the state of the media environment.87
Legal challenges to the agency’s non-action decision quickly followed,
but in November 2017, before those challenges reached oral argument, FCC

77. Id. at 51–52.
78. Id. at 52.
79. Id. at 60–61 (Scirica, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 61.
82. Id. at 61–62 (indicating that Judge Scirica would issue a writ of mandamus to ensure that the
FCC completed final agency action in its review).
83. Id. at 60.
84. Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 31 FCC Rcd. 9865–66 (2016) (Quadrennial Rev.). It should be
noted that in that Order the FCC acknowledged that high speed Internet and other technological
innovations unregulated by the FCC have changed how many Americans consume media, but stressed
that localism—and the newspapers, television stations, and radio stations that provide local content—
remain indispensable.
85. Id. at 9865.
86. See id.
87. Id. (“These rules promote competition and a diversity of viewpoints in local markets, thereby
enriching local communities through the promotion of distinct and antagonistic voices.”).
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leadership changed as a result of the 2016 presidential election. the FCC
released a new media ownership policy as an Order on Reconsideration of
the August 2016 Order.88 The Order on Reconsideration included an
elimination of the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rule89 and the radiotelevision cross-ownership rule.90 Unlike the Second Report and Order from
August 2016, the Order on Reconsideration neither included a revision to the
local radio ownership rule nor directly addressed the Third Circuit’s mandate
to develop a viable minority ownership policy.91
The consolidated challenges to the 2016, 2017, and 2018 Orders on
media ownership returned to the Third Circuit for oral arguments in June
2019. On September 23, 2019, in the fourth and final 2-1 decision written
by Judge Ambro, the Third Circuit handed down the fourth Prometheus
Radio Project decision which, in practical terms, undermined the FCC’s
decision making from 2011 to 2019.92
The panel ruled that yet again the FCC failed to resolve the two core
issues it botched in the two earlier cases: first, meeting the basic
administrative law standard to provide empirical evidence to support a
rational policy decision and proposing a policy solution that would increase
ownership by women and minorities. The FCC showed no embarrassment
when it admitted that the failure to respond to the court’s earlier mandates
was intentional. Judge Ambro’s decision stated that by any rational analysis
the FCC’s effort to support its choices was inadequate and could not even
pass a more deferential review.93
Judge Ambro’s decision proposed the need for the FCC to recognize
that the outcomes of ownership policy are the direct results of choices made

88. Id.
89. Id.; see also id. at 9870 (stating that the FCC no longer believed that the newspaper-broadcast
cross-ownership rule promoted “viewpoint diversity, localism, or competition” and therefore, “does not
serve the public interest”).
90. Id. at 9950.
91. See id. at 9867. The existence of the Prometheus Radio Project line of cases, but does not
mention the majority’s remand on a functional minority ownership rule. Instead the FCC merely notes
that the case involves, “[v]arious diversity-related decisions, certain media ownership rules and the
decision not to attribute SSAs.” This is not to say that the FCC did not at least attempt—albeit
unsuccessfully—to create an ownership regime which was at least intended to aid minority and female
owners. The FCC termed its creation the “incubator program,” id. at 9911–12. The incubator proposal
paved avenues for additional ownership consolidation, including opportunities to exceed the local limits
set by Congress in the Telecommunications Act for companies willing to incubate a startup through
assistance and foster new entrant broadcasters, id. at 9912; see also Rules and Policies to Promote New
Entry and Ownership Diversity in the Broadcasting Services, 33 FCC Rcd. 7911, 7911–12 (2018) (in
which the FCC describes the Incubator Program as method to foster new and diverse voices into the
broadcast industry).
92. Prometheus Radio Project v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 939 F.3d 567, 589 (3d Cir. 2019) (“We
do conclude . . . that the [FCC] has not shown yet that it adequately considered the effect its actions since
Prometheus III will have on diversity in broadcast media ownership. We therefore vacate and remand the
Reconsideration and Incubator Orders in their entirety, as well as the ‘eligible entity’ definition from the
2016 Report & Order.”) [hereinafter Prometheus IV].
93. Id. at 585–86.
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by the agency. Prophesizing that this would likely not be the last review of
media ownership policy, Judge Ambro stated that in future reviews the FCC
would have to show its work and even determine whether other choices or
approaches might be better.94
Judge Scirica concurred and dissented for the fourth and final time.
While Judge Scirica joined with much of the majority opinion, he noted that
by interfering in the FCC’s administrative process for so long, the Third
Circuit had essentially caused the relevant media ownership rules to remain
in place for fifteen years.95 In doing so, the Third Circuit had caused the FCC
to not comply with the purpose of Section 202(h)—keeping up with the
changes in the media marketplace.96 And because the public interest changes
as the media marketplace changes, the Third Circuit had interfered with the
FCC’s ability to act in the public interest despite the FCC’s repeated attempts
to regulate.97 By choosing to not grant the FCC the deference it deserves as
an expert agency implementing an iterative statute, Judge Scirica accused
the majority of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of FCC failure to meet the
standards the Prometheus court chose to impose.98
Over Judge Scirica’s argument that the FCC was due deference, the
Third Circuit vacated and remanded the bulk of the FCC’s regulatory action
on minority ownership, including the 2017 Reconsideration Order.99 The
Third Circuit, yet again, retained jurisdiction over the remanded issues and
all other petitions for review.100
The day after the decision released, the FCC also released an Order
approving a merger of TV stations under one of the ownership deregulations
vacated in Prometheus IV.101 Then the FCC and the National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB) each requested a rehearing and en banc review on
November 7, 2019. The FCC’s filing argued that the Third Circuit had for

94. Id. at 586.
95. Id. at 589 (Scirica, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. Id. at 591 (“Embodied in Section 202(h) is the imperative that the broadcast ownership rules
stay in sync with the media marketplace.”).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 593.
99. Id. at 587–88.
100. Id. (“Accordingly, we vacate the Reconsideration Order and the Incubator Order in their
entirety, as well as the ‘eligible entity’ definition from the 2016 Report & Order. On remand the [FCC]
must ascertain on record evidence the likely effect of any rule changes it proposes and whatever ‘eligible
entity’ definition it adopts on ownership by women and minorities, whether through new empirical
research or an in-depth theoretical analysis. If it finds that a proposed rule change would likely have an
adverse effect on ownership diversity but nonetheless believes that rule in the public interest all things
considered, it must say so and explain its reasoning. If it finds that its proposed definition for eligible
entities will not meaningfully advance ownership diversity, it must explain why it could not adopt an
alternate definition that would do so. Once again we do not prejudge the outcome of any of this, but the
[FCC] must provide a substantial basis and justification for its actions whatever it ultimately decides.”).
101. See Consent to Assign Certain Licenses from Red River Broadcast Co., LLC to Gray
Television Licensee, LLC, 34 FCC Rcd. 8590, 8590, 8593 (2019) (justifying the granting of a license to
Gray Television on the basis that the decision was case-by-case and circumstance specific).
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fifteen years functionally replaced the FCC’s authority on media ownership
policy. Less than two weeks later, on November 20, 2019, Judge Ambro
authored a decision denying a review by the full panel.
On November 29, 2019, the panel issued a mandate formally
implementing the remand. On December 20, 2019, the FCC’s Media Bureau
responded to the mandate with an order which concluded the 2014
Quadrennial Review, the 2010 Quadrennial Review, and the incubator
program.102 The Media Bureau’s Order reimplemented the long-standing
newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership ban, radio-television cross-ownership
rule, local television ownership rule, local radio ownership rule, and
television JSA attribution rules.103 The FCC marked the 2017 Order on
Reconsideration and the incubator program as repealed.104 Finally, the 2016
Order’s reinstatement of the eligible entity designation was also repealed in
line with the Third Circuit’s remand in Prometheus IV.105 In the end,
Prometheus IV left the FCC’s media ownership rules where they had been
since the decision in Prometheus I in 2004, and arguably since the
implementation of the Telecommunications Act.

IV. PUTTING OUT THE FIRE
A. HOW THE OPINION CONSTRUED THE FACTS/BACKGROUND
Given the diversity of issues that the Prometheus case line concerned,
one might imagine that the Supreme Court’s construal of the matter would
reflect that diversity. That was only partially the case. In its retelling of the
facts, Justice Kavanaugh, speaking for a unanimous court, gave a brief
retelling of how the matter came before the Court. The opinion explained
that Section 202(h) in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 required the FCC
to “repeal or modify any ownership rules that the agency determines are no
longer in the public interest.”106 That requirement led the FCC in its 2017
Reconsideration Order to order the repeal two rules (the
Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule and the Radio/Television
Cross-Ownership Rule) and modify a third (the Local Television Ownership
Rule).107 That 2017 order was challenged by Prometheus Radio Project,
along with other parties, as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative
Procedure Act.108

102. Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 34 FCC Rcd. 12360, 12360–61 (2019) (Quadrennial Rev.).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1154, 1154 (2021)
[hereinafter Prometheus V].
107. Id.
108. Id.
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In his opinion, Justice Kavanaugh also gave a constrained retelling of
the history of the matter. First, Justice Kavanaugh began by reaffirming the
FCC’s broad authority to regulate in the public interest, and acknowledged
that the FCC has affirmatively sought to promote competition, localism, and
viewpoint diversity by, “ensuring that a small number of entities do not
dominate a particular media market.”109 Kavanaugh went on to acknowledge
that Section 202(h) had been adopted by Congress because of Congress’s
fear that the FCC’s ownership rules would remain the same due to regulatory
inertia.110 According to this view, Congress’s foresight on the matter was
appropriate since passage of time and technological advancement in media
had “dramatically” changed and broadened the marketplace that these rules
applied to.111 The opinion also noted that the three rules being modified had
been adopted in the 1960s and 1970s as part of “an early-cable and preInternet age” that was “more limited” in terms of media sources.112 In effect,
the opinion’s history more than implied that the ownership rules at issue were
the kind of rules that Congress had intended to address when it legislated.
Following this exposition, the opinion expounded on what Section
202(h) required. The Court generally accepted the FCC’s view from the 2002
Biennial Regulatory Review—Report.113 By that view, 202(h) established
“an iterative process that requires the FCC to keep pace with industry
developments and to regularly reassess how its rules function in the marketplace.”114 This did not mean the FCC would replace its long-accepted public
interest goals—in fact, the opinion noted that FCC stated repeatedly that its
“traditional public interest goals of. . . competition, localism, and viewpoint
diversity would inform its Section 202(h) analysis.” 115 The opinion
acknowledged that the FCC went a step further, and stated that section
202(h) review “would assess the effects of the ownership rules on minority
and female ownership.”116 The opinion left out, however, that though the

109. Id. at 1155 (citing Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted
Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 17 FCC Rcd. 18503, 18515–27 (2002)
(Biennial Rev.)).
110. Id. at 1156 (describing the process of modification and repeal as one that “requires the FCC to
keep pace with industry developments and to regularly reassess how its rules function in the
marketplace”).
111. Id. at 1155.
112. Id.
113. See Id. at 1156–57 (citing Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 FCC Rcd. 4726, 4732 (2003)
(Biennial Rev.)).
114. Id. at 1156.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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FCC had stated as much in its 1998 and 2002 biennial reviews,117 the
agency’s actions did not substantiate its words.118
Justice Kavanaugh then went on to explain that since the 2002 review,
the FCC had repeatedly endeavored to change several of its rules pursuant to
its Section 202(h) authority, including the three at issue before the Court.119
Those efforts had been repeatedly stymied by the Third Circuit, who had
held the FCC’s regulatory orders as unlawful for “the last 17 years.”120 The
opinion then emphasized that the Third Circuit’s rejection of the FCC’s
orders had essentially frozen the rules at issue.121
The opinion’s factual background then skipped from 2002 to 2016.122
By the opinion’s retelling, in 2016 the agency promulgated the 2016 order—
the fruit of its 2014 biennial review. That order retained the existing rules
with only “minor modifications.”123 Interested parties petitioned the FCC for
reconsideration, which was granted, and the FCC undertook a new public
interest analysis.124 On reconsideration the FCC determined that rapid
change in the media marketplace had “render[ed] some of the ownership
rules obsolete,” and the FCC concluded that the rules “no longer served the
agency’s public interest goals of . . . competition, localism, and viewpoint
diversity.”125 The FCC also stated that these changes in ownership rules were
unlikely to harm minority and female ownership.126 Of course, this skip in
time left out events in the interim that made this assertion dubious—such as
the FCC’s hiding of studies which were critical of the results of the FCC’s
attempts at relaxing its ownership rules.127
The opinion went on to relate that, unhappy with the FCC’s
determinations in its 2017 Reconsideration Order, Prometheus and other
groups petitioned for review by the Third Circuit. The Court explicitly noted

117. See id. (citing Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Pursuant to Section
202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 FCC Rcd. 11058, 11061–62 (2000) (1998 biennial rev.);
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620, 13627, 13634, 1364 n.67 (2002 biennial rev.)).
118. See Prometheus Radio 4-0, supra note 13, at 9 (“The 1998 Biennial review concluded 17
months later, in which the FCC declared it could not meaningfully assess the effects of ownership
consolidation since 1996, primarily because it had not yet completed the initial wave of mergers.”).
119. Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. at 1156 (2021).
120. Id.
121. Id. (“As a result, those three ownership rules exist in substantially the same form today as they
did in 2002.”).
122. Id. (“The current dispute arises out of the FCC’s most recent attempt to change its ownership
rules.”).
123. See id. (quoting Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant
to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 31 FCC Rcd. 9864, 9865 (2016) (quadrennial
rev.) (internal quotations removed)).
124. Id. at 1157.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Prometheus Radio 4-0, supra note 13, at 26 (“The study, titled ‘Review of the Radio
Industry,’ criticized the FCC’s implementation of media ownership policy . . . [T]he number of owners
decreased by 35% thanks almost entirely to mergers between existing owners.”).
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that the Third Circuit agreed with the FCC that three ownership rules no
longer supported the FCC’s public interest goals.128 Nevertheless, the
opinion explained that the Third Circuit, over Judge Scirica’s dissent, held
that “the record did not support the FCC’s conclusion that the rule changes
would ‘have minimal effect’ on minority and female ownership.”129 The
Court concluded by explicitly acknowledging the terms of the Third
Circuit’s remand: the FCC was directed to “‘ascertain on record evidence”
effect that any rule changes were likely have on minority and female
ownership, ‘whether through new empirical research or an in-depth
theoretical analysis.’”130
B. HOW THE OPINION CONSTRUED THE LAW AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS
On this retelling of the facts, the Court reversed the Third Circuit’s
decision in Prometheus IV.131 Specifically, the Court held that the FCC’s
decision to repeal and modify the ownership rules at issue was within “the
zone of reasonableness” required by the APA.
In reversing the Third Circuit’s decision in Prometheus IV, the Court
opinion focused entirely on construing the matter through basic principles of
administrative law.132 Specifically, the opinion focused on three general
points: (1) the deferential nature of State Farm review; (2) the FCC’s
acknowledgement of its imperfect data; and (3) the inability of courts to
impose on an agency additional burdens that are not statutorily imposed—
either by the organic statute or the APA.133
The opinion first explained that the APA’s arbitrary and capricious
standard merely requires that agency action be “reasonable and reasonably
explained.”134 The opinion expanded on this basic tenet of administrative law
by stating that State Farm review requires that courts “simply ensures that
the agency has acted with a zone of reasonableness and has reasonably
considered the relevant issues and reasonably explained the decision.”135 In
other words, the Court merely held what is already well-accepted
administrative law precedent: State Farm review only requires that an
agency act reasonably and provide a sufficiently reasonable explanation for

128. Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. at 1158.
129. Id. (quoting Prometheus IV, 939 F.3d at 584).
130. Id. (quoting Prometheus IV, 939 F.3d at 590).
131. Id. at 1161.
132. See id. at 1157–61.
133. See id. at 1158–60. In fact, much of the decision turned on a general discussion of what State
Farm review requires of an agency, see also id. at 1158 (“Judicial review under [hard look review] is
deferential, and a court may not substitute its own policy judgment for that of the agency.”).
134. See id. The Court explained in greater depth that “[t]he APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious
standard requires that the agency action be reasonable and reasonably explained . . . . A court simply
ensures that the agency has acted within a zone of reasonableness and, in particular, has reasonably
considered the relevant issues and reasonably explained the decision,” id.
135. Id.
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its actions.136 It does not allow courts to substitute their own policy
preferences for the agency’s policy preferences.137
In the eyes of the Court, the FCC sufficiently completed all that was
required of it.138 As the Court explained it, the FCC rigorously reviewed the
record evidence, and then concluded that repealing both cross-ownership
rules at issue and modifying the third rule would serve to further the current
public interest and satisfy the requirements of Section 202(h).139 The Court
emphasized that the agency explained its findings and also sought public
comment in order to give due consideration to the possible impact the rule
changes would have on minority and female ownership.140 And according to
this narrative, “no arguments were made that would lead the FCC to
conclude that the existing rules were necessary to protect or promote
minority and female ownership”—in fact, comments received by the FCC
suggested the opposite.141 On that record, the FCC cleared State Farm review
because the agency could reasonably conclude that its actions in the 2017
order were reasonable and reasonably explained.
Next, the Court went on to reject the contentions of Prometheus that the
FCC oversimplified its analysis of the relevant data sets, that the data was
incomplete, and that the FCC had ignored superior evidence on the record.
First, the Court noted that the FCC acknowledged the gaps in the data it had
accumulated.142 The Court then emphasized that though the FCC repeatedly
requested data on the issue of minority and female ownership, none was
received.143 Furthermore, the data that Prometheus indicates supported its
contentions was simply interpreted differently by the FCC—and that
interpretation was reasonable given the nature of the data.144 By the Court’s
view, the FCC did what it could with the data that it had, and its policy
decisions were reasonably derived from the data that it possessed, and that is

136. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (“The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”).
137. Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. at 1158, 1160.
138. Id. at 1160 (“In light of the sparse record on minority and female ownership and the FCC’s
findings with respect to competition, localism, and viewpoint diversity, we cannot say that the agency’s
decision to repeal or modify the ownership rules fell outside the zone of reasonableness for purposes of
the APA.”).
139. Id. at 1158.
140. Id.
141. Id. It should be noted that it is questionable what the Court refers to as “arguments” given the
unearthing of the Powell study which concluded the opposite of what the Court claims here. See
Prometheus 4-0, supra note 13, at 26.
142. Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. at 1159.
143. Id. (“And despite repeatedly asking for data on the issue, the Commission received no other
data on minority ownership and no data at all on female ownership levels.”).
144. Id. at 1159–60 (indicating that “the Free Press studies were purely backward-looking, and
offered no statistical analysis of the likely future effects of the FCC’s proposed rule changes on minority
and female ownership.”).
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all that is required of the agency to satisfy APA arbitrary and capricious
review.145
Finally, the Court acknowledged that though the FCC did not have
perfect data,146 there was no requirement on the FCC to collect the data.147
In fact, the Court emphasized that not only does the APA not impose such a
requirement, Section 202(h) does not require this on the part of the FCC
either.148 So while the Court did not explicitly say that lower courts may not
impose extra burdens not imposed by statute on agencies, its citation of
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Counsel and its affirmation that Section 202(h) does not require data
aggregation implied the invocation of this basic principle of administrative
law.149 The Court’s concluded by stating that the FCC’s request of data and
decision-making on the data received was sufficiently inside the zone of
reasonableness required by the APA.150
C. JUSTICE THOMAS’ CONCURRENCE
Justice Thomas’s Concurring opinion approaches some of the issues left
unaddressed by in the majority opinion by looking as far back to the FCC’s
actions in the 2002 Biennial review.151 Although the larger point Justice
Thomas sought to convey is that the FCC had no obligation to consider
minority or female ownership, he conflated several ideas together. In doing
so, he concluded that “the FCC’s ownership rules-unlike some of its
nonownership rules-were never designed to foster ownership diversity.” 152
While FCC statements at many points over the last 25 years would
directly contradict Justice Thomas’s conclusion, including a handful that
Justice Thomas cites himself, in the 2002 Biennial NPRM, the FCC, citing

145. Id. (stating that having imperfect data and making decisions based upon imperfect data “is not
unusual in day-to-day agency decision making”).
146. Id. at 1160. It should be noted that Prometheus specifically mentioned the fact that the FCC
had no data on female ownership when making the decision, but the Court did not include that detail,
instead opting for the narrative argued by the Industry Petitioners. Compare Brief for Respondents
Prometheus Radio Project, et al. at 30, 33, Fed. Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. 1150 (No. 19-1231) (“[T]here
was no NTIA data on female ownership . . . . [A]ny ostensible conclusion as to female ownership was
not based on any record evidence at all.”) (internal quotations omitted), with Opening Brief for Industry
Petitioners at 14, Fed. Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. 1150 (No. 19-1231) (“Section 1 provides no support for
the conclusion that Section 202(h) requires the Commission to promote minority and female
ownership.”).
147. Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. at 1160 (“And nothing in the Telecommunications Act (or any other
statute) requires the FCC to conduct its own empirical or statistical studies before exercising its discretion
under Section 202(h).”).
148. Id. (“The APA imposes no general obligation on agencies to conduct . . . statistical studies. . . .
And nothing in the Telecommunications Act . . . requires the FCC to conduct . . . statistical studies before
exercising its discretion under Section 202(h).”).
149. Id. See supra notes 151–53 at 1160.
150. Id. at 1160.
151. Id. at 1162
152. Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. at 1161 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Sinclair states that “ownership limits encourage diversity in the ownership
of broadcast stations.”153 The agency continues to state that, “the control of
media outlets by a variety of independent owners is outlet diversity.”154
Justice Thomas also shortchanges the conclusions made by the Third
Circuit when reviewing the FCC’s decision making. Justice Thomas focused
on the premise that the FCC made a decision based on the record before it,
as well as a corresponding premise that the Third Circuit could not mandate
that the agency consider minority or female ownership.155 This, like Justice
Kavanaugh’s opinion, left out a significant element of each of the four
remands: that the Third Circuit was concerned about how and why the FCC
had drawn its conclusions.
But, rather oddly, J. Thomas’s concurrence lacks reference to the
empirical and investigative elements that were so central to the Third
Circuit’s decisions.156 In 2003, the Third Circuit pointed out (correctly) that
the FCC’s Diversity Index was mathematically flawed.157 That same court
followed this up in 2007 with the assertion that the FCC had failed to
demonstrate how its Eligible Entity program could correct the ownership
imbalance the program was implemented to fix.158 The Third Circuit’s
majority opinion in 2016 in Prometheus III was intended to push the FCC to
act in a proceeding it had extended beyond the statutory mandates when it
failed to complete the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Reviews.159 The decision
in Prometheus IV similarly spoke to more than the FCC’s misguided
Incubator Proposal, and Justice Thomas makes no effort to address the Third
Circuit’s assessment of a failing grade to the FCC in “any introductory
statistics class.”160
D. WHAT WAS LEFT OUT?
The Court’s opinion is undoubtably, and likely needfully, narrow. But,
in reducing Prometheus case line’s intricacies to easily resolved questions of
basic administrative law, the Court chose carefully which questions it sought
153. Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 17 FCC Rcd. 18503, 18515 (2002) (quadrennial rev.).
154. Id. at 18516.
155. Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. at 1161 (Thomas, J., concurring).
156. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
157. Prometheus 4-0, supra note 13, at 16.
158. Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 471-72; Hatching Some Empirical Evidence, supra note 41, at 414,
414 n.80.
159. Prometheus III, 824 F.3d 33, 37 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that the FCC has unreasonably
delayed action on its definition of an ‘eligible entity’—a term it has attempted to use as a lynchpin for
initiatives to promote minority and female broadcast ownership—and we remand with an order for it to
act promptly.”). It is also important to return to the fact that the Third Circuit said what it meant and
meant what it said in no uncertain terms, see id. (“Several broadcast owners have petitioned us to wipe
all the rules off the books in response to this delay. . . . [W]e note that this remedy, while extreme, might
be justified in the future if the Commission does not act quickly to carry out its legislative mandate.”).
160. Prometheus IV, 939 F.3d at 586, rev’d sub nom. Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. 1150 (2021).
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to answer and which it did not seek to answer. And likely because of this,
the majority’s unanimous decision leaves out much of what the Third
Circuit’s decisions turned on. Most notably it declined to provide clarity and
guidance on the statutory language Section 202(h), how the agency should
resolve the ongoing unacted upon 2018 review (to say nothing of the
agency’s requirement to begin a new review in 2022), and what “the public
interest” requires of FCC.
At the heart of the matter is what Section 202(h) authority both required
of the FCC and empowered the FCC to do. All parties to the matter briefed
the Court on what Section 202(h) required.161 While both sets of petitioners
argued that the FCC was correct in its modification and elimination of
ownership rules—whether because the 202(h)’s purpose is deregulatory in
nature162 or forward-looking in nature163—Prometheus argued that 202(h)
review’s purpose is merely review and specifically in the public interest.164
These three readings need not be mutually exclusive to one another, and all
three can plausibly be held as legitimate readings of 202(h): one could
plausibly read 202(h) as a forward-looking provision meant to ensure
deregulation where needed to further the public interest and continued
regulation in favor of the public interest where needed. But though all three
might be commensurable with one another, each reading prioritizes a
different facet of the statutory language.165 The Court did not obviate the

161. See Brief for the Petitioners at 33, Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. 1150 (No. 19-1231) (“Section
202(h) requires the FCC to review ex-isting ownership regulations quadrennially to deter-mine “whether
any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.”) [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioners]; see also Opening Brief for Industry Petitioners at 25–27, Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. 1150
(No. 19-1231) (“The text of Section 202(h) is clear. The FCC must periodically evaluate its broadcast
ownership rules and “repeal” or “modify” any such rule that is no longer “in the public interest as the
result of competition.”) [hereinafter Opening Brief]; Brief for Respondents Prometheus Radio Project, et
al. at 27, Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. 1150 (No. 19-1231) (“Beginning with the text, § 202(h) mandates
‘regulatory review,’ and doubles down on the public-interest focus of that review.”) [hereinafter Brief for
Respondents].
162. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 164, at 43 (“Section 202(h) contemplates an iterative process
by which the FCC makes frequent assessments of the public interest, re-vises its rules accordingly, and
then monitors the effects of the new rules in anticipation of the next quadrennial review.”).
163. See Opening Brief, supra note 164, at 26 (“Section 202(h) is the capstone of this deregulatory
effort.”).
164. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 164, at 27 (“The Commission must first determine whether
ownership rules remain ‘necessary in the public interest’ . . . . Any modification is made only after a
determination that the rules are ‘no longer in the public interest.’”).
165. Compare Brief for Respondents, supra note 164, at 8, (“Nor does § 202(h) require deregulation
at all costs.”), with Opening Brief, supra note 164, at 26 (“Section 202(h) requires the Commission to
consider competition, not minority and female ownership. The plain text of the statute establishes a
deregulatory presumption requiring the FCC to repeal or modify any rule that is no longer necessary in
the public interest as the result of competition.”) (internal quotations omitted), and Brief for Petitioners,
supra note 164, at 43(“Section 202(h) contemplates an iterative process by which the FCC makes frequent
assessments of the public interest, re-vises its rules accordingly, and then monitors the effects of the new
rules in anticipation of the next quadrennial review.”).
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question of which prioritization is the most plausible or even if all three
readings truly are consonant with one another.166
This problem becomes magnified when one considers the second major
element left unresolved by Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion—how to resolve the
2018 review. Whatever the agency decides to do to conclude the 2018 review
in the short time remaining before the 2022 quadrennial review process is
scheduled to begin will be subject to legal challenge. By approving the
FCC’s 2017 decision, but not providing some guidance on future reviews
moving forward, Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion does little to assuage the
likelihood of the FCC finding itself back in court defending another pair of
media ownership decisions in the near future. Of the shortcomings of the
breadth of the Court’s narrow decision, the failure to remand the entire
proceeding back to the agency to be resolved as part of the open and ongoing
2018 review process, an action proposed by the Citizen Petitioners, will be
the one with the most lasting consequences for the agency.
Third, and most importantly, the Court never spoke to what “the public
interest” really requires of the FCC. While the Court decided the matter
neatly on administrative law grounds, the issues present in the Prometheus
case line were not limited to rote administrative law questions. At the heart
of the matter is how much room to run will be granted to agencies by the
courts in regulating in the public interest—and this was touched upon by
each party brief.167 Yet this was entirely absent from the opinion. In fact, in
skipping from the 2002 review to the 2016 review and then 2017 order, the
Court appeared to intentionally avoid the drama that was Prometheus.168
Perhaps this makes sense, since the full history of this matter may not lend
itself to a clear-cut administrative law decision.
A full history of Prometheus clouds the conclusion that the Third
Circuit had obviously violated basic tenets of administrative law with
considerations of equity. While J. Kavanaugh’s opinion was careful to point
out that the opinion only spoke to the FCC’s decision in the 2017
Reconsideration Order,169 the matter was so much more than just one
reconsideration order. This matter consisted of nearly two decades of
fighting about what ownership of media would look like. In the course of
seventeen years of litigation the media world saw an agency suppress studies,
166. See Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. at 1150.
167. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 164, at 33 (arguing that the Third Circuit’s consideration
of minority and female ownership as dispositive of whether the FCC was acting in the public interest was
incorrect as a matter of law); see also Opening Brief, supra note 164, at 30 (explaining the historic,
contextual meaning of “in the public interest” as the phrase relates to the FCC); see also Brief for
Respondents, supra note 164, at 23 (indicating that the question before the Court really turns on the
“lodestar” question of what acting in the public interest means).
168. Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. at 573–77.
169. Prometheus V, 141 S. Ct. at 1156 n.1 (“The FCC currently has two other ownership rules that
are subject to its quadrennial Section 202(h) review . . . . [And] [t]he FCC has one additional ownership
rule . . . . Those other rules are not at issue in this case.”).
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those studies coming to light, rapid change in media markets, consolidation
of the media market in larger media corporations, the establishment of the
Internet as a dominating force in the media market, and much more. It was a
drama, a tragicomedy, and an effort in squaring agency action (and inability
to act) with the public interest. Those complications are likely why the Court
avoided the thorny normative question of what the public interest requires,
but that avoidance leaves the disposition of the matter in the lurch.
In the end, the Citizen Petitioners were handed the narrow
administrative decision they sought, and, unfortunately for Prometheus
Radio Project, the decision was unfavorable.170 Importantly though, the
decision’s narrow focus does little, in practical terms, to resolve the
longstanding impasses that motivated the litigation in the first place. Justice
Kavanaugh’s opinion, which focused almost exclusively with the FCC’s
2017 media ownership decision certainly provides some additional
deference to the FCC on media ownership decision-making. With the FCC’s
composition subject to political swings based on the Presidential
administration, giving the FCC additional deference on how to interpret and
apply the requirements of Section 202(h), the FCC’s rationales and approach
to media ownership policy will also likely ebb and flow based on the
controlling party. As these ongoing decisions unfold, the likelihood for
inconsistent action is just as likely to increase efforts towards future legal
challenges to those decisions.

V. CONCLUSION
The Court looked at twenty-five years of regulatory decision making,
more than seventeen years across four decisions by the Third Circuit,
shrugged, and focused only on the FCC’s 2017 Order on Reconsideration
which was the least significant agency action during of this lengthy process.
In the end, or at least the end for now, Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion imposes
at least a brief pause while we all wait for more judicial review of the
agency’s next round of action.

170. Id. at 1150.
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